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W. Ted Minick* and A. D. Bynum**
P ROCEDURAL issues continue to predominate in reported cases. This
fact alone is not surprising since procedure is the common denomina-
tor for all reported cases. However, a comprehensive perusal of the sev-
eral hundred cases decided in the past year' dealing with procedural
issues makes it apparent that other factors contribute to the proliferation
of such issues. These factors are: (1) expansive and sometimes confusing
judicial interpretations of established rules to fit new factual contexts,
and (2) failure of some members of the bar to adhere to established
rules. The demand placed upon trial and appellate lawyers to have quick
recall of hundreds of rules with multiple judicial interpretations becomes,
at times, overwhelming. Unfortunately, the trend is toward even more
complex procedure.
The purpose of this Article is to explicate some of the more significant
developments in this area of the law in the past year. The bulk of the
textual material will deal with those areas in which the authors found
the appellate courts to be most active.
Pleadings. Defendants seem to have had more difficulty with pleadings in
the past year than did plaintiffs. For example, in Craig v. Genie Toys,
Inc.," a suit on a sworn account, the defendant's answer and affidavit
stated "the amount prayed for in Plaintiff's original petition is not just
or true."' The affidavit also stated that the amount prayed for in the
plaintiff's original petition was "not due either wholly or in part." The
court of civil appeals held that the defendant did not comply with the
provisions of rule 185,' and thus would not be permitted to deny the
claim. The court pointed out that the defendant did not state that the
claim was not just or true in whole or in part, but only that the amount
prayed for was not just or true. Thus, since the plaintiff's petition prayed
for attorney's fees, interest, and costs, the defendant had .not properly
denied the claim which formed the basis of the suit. This case empha-
sizes the technical requirements imposed by the courts in certain situa-
tions, particularly where sworn pleadings are required.
The requirements of rule 950 were at issue in Harrison v. Leasing
* B.A., Eastern Washington State College; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Abilene Christian College; J.D., Baylor University; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
"Volumes 443 through 456 of the South Western Reporter, Second Series.
2444 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
aid. at 310.
4 Id.
* Tix. R. Civ. P. 185 required the defendant to state on his oath that the claim against him
was "not just or true, in whole or in part. ... Effective January 1, 1971, this language has
been changed to "stating that each and every item is not just or true, or that some specified item
or items are not just and true."STEx. R. Crv. P. 95 provides: "When a defendant shall desire to prove payment, he shall file
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Associates, Inc.,' a suit on a promissory note. The defendant, in a sworn
answer, alleged that $20,000 had been paid without credit. The plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the court of civil
appeals affirmed. Since the plea of payment was in general language, it
was a pure conclusion and was not sufficient to preclude a summary
judgment. Credits and offsets must be pled with specificity.
In another suit on a sworn account, Fortinberry v. Freeway Lumber
Co.,' the defendant filed a proper sworn denial. The plaintiff then filed
an amended petition adding a partnership composed of the original indi-
vidual defendants but leaving the substance of the claim unaltered. The
trial court refused to allow the defendant to deny the sworn account.
The court of civil appeals reversed, apparently relying upon rule 92."
The plaintiff argued that rule 92 applied only to general denials, but
the court rejected the argument: "We think the account remained the
same and the plaintiff had no occasion to be misled by the failure of
the appellant to repeat his denial in the form set out in Rule 185."" The
opinion does not mention whether the new defendant, the partnership,
filed an answer. Thus, it would appear that the partnership failed to
comply with rule 185. The court found support in McDonald's Texas
Civil Practice" and the decision is probably correct, but reliance upon
rule 92 appears misplaced.
In Pewthers v. Holland Page Industries, Inc.,"a one of the two de-
fendants died after filing his answer. A writ of scire facias was issued
notifying his executor that he had a certain number of days to appear
in defense. After this time had elapsed, the executor had not filed an
answer. Pursuant to a motion of the plaintiff, a default judgment was
rendered against the defendant's estate. The court of civil appeals re-
versed, holding that an executor appearing pursuant to a writ of scire
facias does not have to file an answer but rather adopts the pleadings
of the deceased party."
Kaine v. Cooney" involved the opposite side of a similar issue. This
case, a suit on a mechanic's and materialman's lien with multiple de-
fendants and multiple lots of land, was a result of the consolidation of
several pending causes. Upon consolidation, the parties were ordered to
replead. In repleading, the plaintiff omitted three of the original de-
with his plea an account stating distinctly the nature of such payment, and the several items
thereof; failing to do so, he shall not be allowed to prove the same, unless it be so plainly and
particularly described in the plea as to give the plaintiff full notice of the character thereof."
'454 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
8453 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
' TEX. R. Cirv. P. 92 provides: "A general denial of matters pleaded by the adverse party which
are not required to be denied under oath, shall be sufficient to put the same in issue. Where the
defendant had pleaded a general denial, and the plaintiff shall afterward amend his pleading, such
original denial shall be presumed to extend to all matters subsequently set up by the plaintiff."
10453 S.W.2d at 852.
" 2 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE S 8.10 (1970).
"2443 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
"The court also held that since TEX. R. Civ. P. 330(b) provides that settings will be made
in the month preceding the month of the setting, the court could not render a valid default judg-
ment where the setting was not made in the prior month.
14448 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
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fendants. The appellate court held that the omitted parties were just
as effectively dismissed from the suit as if a formal dismissal as to them
had been entered.
In another case, the pleadings were found to be sufficient but the parties
were not. In Hampton v. Sharp" attorneys for two of the four defendants
filed answers on behalf of all four, without the knowledge of two of the
defendants. The trial court allowed a withdrawal of appearance for the
two unknowing defendants. The appellate court affirmed on the grounds
that the two defendants had no knowledge of the suit and had not
authorized the attorneys to make an appearance for them. The court
also indicated that the question of whether such action would be pre-
judicial to the plaintiffs was relevant.
One appellate court, in Willis Sears Trucking Co. v. Pate,"0 was con-
fronted by an "inexcusable barbarism . . .sired by indolence and damned
by indifference."1 The cause of the court's consternation was the phrase
"and/or" in the plaintiff's petition. The court could only adopt the
"choice judicial epithets heaped upon this 'confusing hybrid' "i contained
in two A.L.R. annotations. 9 The allegations concerned the acts of an
employee and his employer. The court held that it could not distinguish
to whom the plaintiff was referring in particular allegations of negligence
because of the phrase "and/or." The plaintiff should have made separate
allegations for each of the parties or separate conjunctive and disjunctive
allegations.
In a suit for cancellation and recission of a guaranty on a note, the
plaintiff denied under oath that he had signed the guaranty agreement.
During the trial, the defendant's special exception to the plea of non
est factum was granted. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to
amend to delete the words "to the best of his information and belief."
The appellate court in Einhorn v. Irving Bank & Trust Co."0 held this
to be reversible error, since rule 661 requires that trial amendments be
allowed unless they would prejudice the opposite party.
Jurisdiction. Connell v. Shanafeit'" was the only case reaching the appel-
late courts during the survey period involving substantive jurisdiction of
the court. There, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of a mechanic's and
materialman's lien." The court of civil appeals held that the county court
did not have jurisdiction of such a suit even though the actual amount in
controversy was within its jurisdictional limits, and that such an action
may be brought only in a district court.
Several cases were decided involving procedural jurisdiction. Collins
1'447 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error rel. n.r.e.
'9452 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970).
" Cochrane v. Florida East Coast Ry., 107 Fla. 431, 432, 145 So. 217, 218 (1932).
18452 S.W.2d at 784.
'
9 Annot., 154 A.L.R. 866 (1945); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 1367 (1939).
20443 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
21 TEx. R. Civ. P. 66.
22446 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
'TEx. Rnv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (1964).
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v. Mize" involved a sale of Texas realty consummated within Texas by
the defendant and others. The defendant subsequently removed from
the state. The Texas supreme court held that the defendant's contacts
with Texas were sufficient, as against a due process challenge, to sustain
jurisdiction under article 203 1b.' In view of the federal court's construc-
tion of article 2031b, that the Texas legislature intended to exercise the
full constitutional limits of long-arm jurisdiction," this decision is not
surprising.
In Van Winkle-Hooker Co. v. Rice7 the non-resident defendant lost
a 120a 5 motion and then asked for a dismissal on the basis of forum non
conveniens. The sole ground advanced for such motion was that the
defendant resided out-of-state. The trial court granted the motion, but
the appellate court reversed, holding that the burden was upon the party
seeking dismissal to bring forward evidence of probative force that he
would actually be substantially inconvenienced by a trial in the foreign
state. The mere fact of out-of-state residence was insufficient.
In Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Evans Advertising Agency,
Inc."' Evans was awarded a default money judgment against Aamco, a
non-resident defendant who had been served under rule 108."0 The court
held that error was present on the face of the record, since rule 108 does
not vest Texas courts with jurisdiction to render a personal judgment
against a non-resident. The rule is nothing more than a means of pro-
viding notice to a non-resident of a suit involving realty located within
the state."
In Neal v. Roberts" the plaintiff urged two separate grounds for ob-
taining jurisdiction over the defendant. Kent held a power of attorney
from Neal which authorized Kent to act in certain capacities regarding
certain property. In a suit against both Neal and Kent for services per-
formed, the plaintiff served Kent only, relying upon either the power of
attorney, or, alternatively, article 203 3 b,' to obtain jurisdiction over Neal.
The court held that since the power of attorney did not expressly author-
ize Kent to accept service of process for Neal, service upon Kent was
insufficient as to Neal. The article 2033b grounds were also disapproved,
because the serving officer did not certify his inability to locate Neal.
Thus, since Neal was not legally served, did not enter an appearance,
24 447 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1969).
'TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
"
5 Barnes v. Irving Trust Co., 290 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
27 448 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
28TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a provides that any party may, by sworn motion, make a special ap-
pearance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court.
29450 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
30 TEx. R. Civ. P. 108.
a VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 156
(1967).
32 445 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
' TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2033b (1964) provides for service of process on an agent
who resides in a county other than the county of residence of the principal. A requirement for
the use of art. 2033b is that the process sought to be served on the principal be returned with the
certification "that after diligent search and inquiry a principal cannot be found and served .... "
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and was not dismissed, the judgment against Kent was interlocutory
and the cause was unappealable.
Parties. Texas community property laws continued to create problems
in cases where a cause of action accrues to a married woman. Charter
Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Few" illustrates the reluctance of Texas courts
to fully accept legislative efforts to grant a greater degree of independence
to married women. In Charter Oak a wife brought suit to recover work-
men's compensation benefits, joining her husband as a pro forma party.
The husband appeared at the trial and testified on behalf of the wife.
The judgment awarded the recovery to the husband and wife and used
the plural '"plaintiffs," as opposed to the singular *"plaintiff" used in the
pleadings. The court of civil appeals held that the husband was a mere
pro forma party and was not a protagonist according to the dictionary
definition of that term. As such, the husband was without any right to
control or direct the course of the suit and could not recover affirmative
relief. Since workmen's compensation benefits are community property,
he was a legal owner of any compensation recovered and was therefore
a necessary and indispensable party to the suit. The court rejected the
holding in General Insurance Co. of America v. Casper' and relied upon
Petroleum Anchor Equipment Co. v. Tyra.' The rendition of the judg-
ment in favor of both husband and wife was not sufficient to cure the
error. Justice Moore put forth a well-reasoned dissent, relying primarily
upon article 4626."' He argued that the second sentence of the article
was permissive rather than mandatory. He also argued that the husband
was a sufficiently active participant in the trial to be considered a formal
party. The dissent appears to have the better argument, particularly on
the statutory grounds. However, until such time as appellate courts fully
accept article 4626," it appears advisable to include the husband as a
formal party, particularly in suits for workmen's compensation benefits.
Subrogation suits also pose serious difficulties for Texas courts in de-
termining necessary and indispensable parties. In Price v. Couch Price's
carrier repaired his automobile and was subrogated to his claim against
Couch. Couch filed suit against Price for damages arising out of the same
accident. The suit resulted in an agreed judgment. Before the judgment
was entered, Price brought suit against Couch in a separate action. After
the first suit had been terminated, Price's carrier alleged that it was the
real party in interest under its assignment. The trial court granted Couch's
motion for summary judgment in the second suit on the basis that the
34456 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error granted.
5 431 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1968). Here it was held that the non-joinder of the husband of a
workmen's compensation claimant was not fundamental error.
n 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966). See text accompanying note 48 infra.
' TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4626 (Supp. 1970) provides: "A spouse may sue and be
sued without the joinder of the other spouse. When claims or liabilities are joint and several, the
spouses may be joined under the rules relating to joinder of parties generally."
"
8TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4626 (Supp. 1970).
39448 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error granted.
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cause of action was a compulsory counterclaim under rule 97 (a) " and
was thus barred by res judicata. The court of civil appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the carrier had a duty to intervene and file its counterclaim in
the first suit and when it failed to do so, the action was barred by the
previous judgment. Thus, the carrier was held to be a necessary party but
not an indispensable party. The result was that the absence of the carrier
in the first suit was not fundamental error which would require reversal,
but since the carrier was a necessary party, it was bound by the first suit.
However, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that neither
prior case law nor rule 97 (a) imposes a duty on the insurer to intervene
in cases where the first suit was filed by a party other than the insured.4'
Traders C. General Insurance Co. v. Richardson"' and Garrett v. Matthews"
were distinguished on the grounds that in those cases the first suit had
been filed by the insured. Rule 97 (a) was construed to apply only to a
"pleader."" A dissent argued that the majority's decision violated the
rule against splitting causes of action. This result may well be justified
under the facts of the case, which are not uncommon. However, the
decision seems to settle the question raised in last year's Survey article'
with regard to Thoreson v. Thompson," in that a subrogated insurance
company is not an indispensable party. Thoreson was not mentioned in the
instant case.
The question of necessary and indispensable parties arose under a point
of error alleging improper severance in Swafford v. Holman.7 The plain-
tiff sued two finance companies and two attorneys employed by one of
the finance companies for damages arising out of wrongful attempts
to enforce a judgment. The trial court severed the suits against the two
attorneys and thereafter granted summary judgment in their favor. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that since the trial court has broad
discretion to grant severance, and since the case involved joint and several
liability, it was not error to sever. The court quoted the familiar tests
set out in Petroleum Anchor Equipment Co. v. Tyra:" An "indispensable
party" is one who claims such an interest in the matter that a judgment
could not be rendered without his being a party, while a "necessary party"
is one who only claims an interest in the matter but who has a severable
interest. Under the rule of Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co."9
the plaintiff could sue any one of the tort-feasors separately. Thus, the
two individuals were not indispensable parties to the suit against the
finance companies.
In contrast to the above cases, a court of civil appeals in O'Byrne v.
4 TEX. R. CIv. P. 97(a).
41 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 83 (1970).
4387 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965), error ref.
43343 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961).
44 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 84.
"McElhaney, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 179, 182(1969).
0B431 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1968).
47446 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
48406 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1966).
4 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
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Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank" held that in an action to set aside a
deed where the grantee had subsequently conveyed an easement to the
Texas Gas Corporation, the corporation was a necessary party. The court
could not adjudicate the case without the corporation before it. Thus,
the corporation was an indispensable party under the rule in Petroleum
Anchor."
Continuance. Two cases decided in the past year uphold the proposition
that the trial court has great discretion in the management of its docket,
limited only by due process requirements and the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure." In Combined Underwriters Life Insurance Co. v. Wells
the plaintiff and defendant, on January 10, agreed before the court to
postpone the trial to January 27. However, the court called the case
to trial on January 16, the defendant's counsel having received notice
on January 15 after he had begun trial of another case. When the defen-
dant did not appear, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, holding the procedure
violative of due process and contrary to the mandate and objectives of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the second case, Marchyn v. Silva,' the
cause was set for trial and was second on the docket. The defendant's
counsel, who officed some forty-two miles from the seat of the court,
learned from an undisclosed source that the first case would probably
go to trial. When the instant case was called for trial, plaintiff's attorney
was present. The trial court had had no communication from the defen-
dant's counsel until an associate from his office telephoned the court short-
ly before 11:00 a.m. The trial judge advised him that jury selection
would begin immediately. By the time the attorney arrived, a jury had
been selected. The attorney submitted a motion for continuance, advising
the court that he would be ready to proceed if the jury would be dis-
charged and another selected. The motion was refused. He then sought
to exercise six peremptory challenges, which were also denied. The court
of civil appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
proceeding to select a jury under the circumstances. The court went on
to say that in these days of crowded dockets, the co-operation of all
parties is essential. The distinction between the two cases is, of course,
the source of the absent attorney's reliance. In the first case, the attorney
relied upon the directions of the court, while in the latter he relied upon
an unofficial source. Thus, these cases constitute a strong warning to
busy attorneys that failure to maintain contact with the court as to
trial settings can result in a loss of valuable rights.
Venue. A number of interesting venue cases were decided in the last year.
Even though venue privileges are considered a valuable personal right,
"0450 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970), error ref. nr.e.
"See text accompanying note 48 supra.
"See, e.g., TEx. R. CIV. P. 330.
'3446 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
54455 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
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Jones v. Klein" stands for the proposition that one individual appearing
in a lawsuit in two different capacities may file a single pleading of privi-
lege. The force of venue rights was asserted in Alamo Express, Inc. v.
Stansell,6 where the defendants did not appear at the venue hearing and
the trial court overruled the plea of privilege without hearing any evi-
dence. The appellate court reversed, holding that the filing of a plea
of privilege constitutes prima facie proof of the defendant's right to
a change of venue and the burden is therefore cast upon the plaintiff
to both plead and prove facts to bring the case within one of the venue
exceptions under article 1995.
57
LaFors v. Finkner," a case decided under subdivision 5 of article 1995, "g
focused upon the place of performance by the defendant in determining
proper venue. The contract, sued upon in Gray County, involved the
purchase of cattle located in Scurry County and to be shipped to Hale
County by the defendant. Scurry County was held to be the proper place
of venue because the defendant was obligated to perform there.
Products liability cases raise some troublesome questions in determining
venue. In Ford Motor Co. v. Ted Arendale Ford Sales, Inc." the plaintiff
purchased a Ford automobile from the defendant. The muffler assembly
apparently was defective and the plaintiff returned the automobile to
Arendale for repairs several times. Subsequently, while backing up, the
muffler assembly dropped, causing the car to spin around and resulting
in bodily injuries to the plaintiff. Suit was brought against both Arendale
and Ford Motor Company. Ford filed a plea of privilege which was over-
ruled. The appellate court held that this case was governed by subdivi-
sion 4.Y Since the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of negligence
against Arendale, accruing in the forum county, and since the cause
of action was joint, venue was sustainable. Alternatively, the court held
that venue in the forum county was proper under subdivision 27 .Y' The
alternative holding was based upon the Texas supreme court holding
in Darryl v. Ford Motor Co.Ya that circumstantial evidence pointing to a
latent defect in the product is sufficient to establish a cause of action. By
5451 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
56445 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
'
7 Tnx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1964).
5 0448 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
5
"TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5 (1964) provides: "If a person has contracted in
writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, expressly naming such county, or a definite
place therein, by such writing, suit upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against
him, either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile."
60447 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
'TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4 (1964) provides in part: "If two or more de-
fendants reside in different counties, suit may be brought in any county where one of the de-
fendants resides."
"2TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 27 (1964) provides: "Foreign corporations, private
or public, joint stock companies or associations, not incorporated by the laws of this State, and
doing business within this State, may be sued in any county where the cause of action or a part
thereof accrued, or in any county where such company may have an agency or representative, or
in the county in which the principal office of such company may be situated; or, when the de-
fendant corporation has no agent or representative in this State, then in the county where the
plaintiffs or either of them, reside."
63440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
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the language used in Darryl-" [t]here is no other explanation in this
record for the cause of the accident"--products liability theory seems
closely analagous to res ipsa loquitur."'
A similar case was Rey-Clif Co. v. Spence," where the plaintiff pur-
chased a defective mobile home from Thompson Trailer Sales in Harris
County, the home county of the plaintiff. A wheel came off the trailer
in New Mexico. The plaintiff sued Thompson, Rey-Clif Company, and
Mobil Scout Manufacturing Company, the latter two being manufac-
turers of the trailer. The pleas of privilege of Mobile Scout and Rey-Clif
were overruled, and Rey-Clif appealed. Plaintiff urged subdivisions 23"
and 29a,"5 and on appeal, subdivision 9a.e" The appellate court reversed,
holding that the home county of Rey-Clif was the proper county for
venue. Since plaintiff offered no evidence that Thompson Trailer Sales
resided in Harris County, subdivision 4 was not applicable. Subdivision 23
could not sustain venue because the plaintiff did not prove a cause of
action against Rey-Clif that arose in part in Harris County or that
Rey-Clif had an agent or representative there. Subdivision 29a was in-
sufficient because Rey-Clif was not a necessary party within the meaning
of that subdivision. Subdivision 9a was rejected because there was no
evidence of any act or omission of negligence occurring in Harris County.
While the holding in this case appears to be opposite to that in Arandale,
there was actually a failure of proof in Rey-Clif. Had plaintiffs estab-
lished that Thompson Trailer Sales resided in Houston, venue could have
been sustained under subdivision 4 as it had been in Arendale.
Southwestern Transfer Co. v. Slay70 presented the Beaumont court of
civil appeals with a conflict of presumptions. The plaintiff pleaded res
61id. at 633.
"s See text following note 74 infra.
"447 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
"7 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 23 (1964) provides in part:
Suits against a private corporation, association, or joint stock company may be
brought in the county in which its principal office is situated; or in the county in
which the cause of action or part thereof arose; or in the county in which the
plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action or part thereof arose, provided such
corporation, association, or company has an agency or representative in such county;
or, if the corporation, association, or joint stock company had no agency or representa-
tive in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action
or part thereof arose, then suit may be brought in the county nearest that in which
plaintiff resided at said time in which the corporation, association, or joint stock
company then had an agency or representative.
65 Trx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 29a (1964) provides: "Whenever there are two or
more defendants in any suit brought in any county in this State and such suit is lawfully main-
tainable therein under the provisions of Article 1995 as to any of such defendants, then such suit
may be maintained in such county against any and all necessary parties thereto."
6 5 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 9a (1964) provides:
A suit based upon negligence per se, negligence at common law or any form of negli-
gence, active or passive, may be brought in the county where the act or omission
of negligence occurred or in the county where the defendant has his domicile. The
venue facts necessary for plaintiff to establish by the preponderance of the evidence
to sustain venue in a county other than the county of defendant's residence are:
1. That an act or omission of negligence occurred in the county where the suit was
filed.
2. That such act or omission was that of the defendant, in person, or that of his
servant, agent or representative acting within the scope of his employment.
3. That such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
70455 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970).
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ipsa loquitur and the defendant filed a plea of privilege which was contro-
verted under subdivision 2371 and which the trial court overruled. The
court of civil appeals reversed, holding that subdivision 23 required full
proof of a cause of action which arose in the county where suit is brought.
Proof of a prima facie cause of action was insufficient. Since res ipsa
loquitur is only a rule of evidence and at most makes out a prima facie
case, the pleadings and proof were not sufficient to maintain venue. The
court stated:
The net effect of the two competing doctrines in this venue case has re-
sulted in a procedural impasse which plaintiff cannot surmount. Defendant's
plea of privilege created a prima facie right to a transfer of the cause until
such time as plaintiff overcame such right by pleading and proof. Plain-
tiff, through the use of the doctrine of res ipsa, proved only a prima facie
cause of action. We are admonished by Goodrich . . . in the case of an
equal doubt between the right to the transfer and the exception, to resolve
the doubt in favor of the transfer. 2
The majority sought to distinguish the cases relied upon by the plaintiff,
in which it was urged that only a prima facie case was necessary. The
majority found that only three of those cases were applicable and that
all three involved the so-called "branded vehicle doctrine.""3 That doctrine
was distinguished from res ipsa loquitur in that the latter is not a true
presumption but only an occurrence that warrants an inference of negli-
gence. Judge Stephenson, in a strongly-worded dissent, argued that a
prima facie case was all that was necessary under subdivision 23. He
argued that if this had been a trial on the merits, the evidence would
support a judgment, and that no greater burden should be placed upon
the plaintiff in a venue hearing. He cited over thirty cases holding that
a lesser burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff in a venue hearing
than in the trial on the merits. The majority holding in this case seems
opposed to that of the Fort Worth court of civil appeals in Ford Motor
Co. v. Ted Arendale Ford Sales, Inc.7' The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is similar to that of strict liability in products-liability cases, as discussed
in the latter case. The difference is that res ipsa loquitur has been charac-
terized as a rule of evidence or procedure, whereas strict liability is a
rule of substantive law. For venue purposes, it becomes difficult to justify
the distinctions created by these two cases.
The question of venue in uninsured motorist cases was faced in Pioneer
Casualty Co. v. Johnson." The supreme court held that since the plain-
tiff proved uninsured motorist coverage, a collision with an uninsured
motorist, and damages, the trial court was correct in overruling the plea
of privilege. The plaintiffs sued upon a judgment against the bankrupt
71 See note 67 supra.
72455 S.W.2d at 356.
"'See Burlington Indus. v. Holladay, 372 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963); Austin
Road Co. v. Willman, 303 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957); Austin Bros. v. Sill,
83 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935).
74447 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
75450 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1970).
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uninsured motorist, and pleaded subdivision 23." The dissent noted the
court's difficulty in distinguishing Pan American Fire &q Casualty Co. v.
Loyd" by quoting from Loyd language to the effect that proof of negli-
gence is required. In the dissent's view, the majority's decision relieved the
plaintiff of the burden of proving negligence and proximate cause. The
dissent seems to have the better of the argument, since proof of negli-
gence and causation is required in order to establish a jury case under
an uninsured motorist policy."8
Summary Judgments. Summary judgment procedure continues to be the
subject of conflicting opinions by the appellate courts. This one area of
the law caused more issues to be raised on appeal than any other in the
past year. Even though the basic premises of the procedure seem to be
well established, trial and appellate courts continue to have difficulty in
applying them. These problems caused members of one court to caution
against undue haste in attempts to dispose of cases under rule 166-A."'
In another case, the summary judgment procedure in a tort situation was
unsuccessfully attacked as unconstitutional."s
The basic premise of the summary judgment procedure was set out
once again by the Texas supreme court in Gibbs v. General Motors Corp."
This was a suit based upon manufacturer's liability where the defendant
offered in support of its motion for summary judgment the affidavit of an
expert, stating that the failure of the unit in question was not the result
of a defect in manufacture. The supreme court reversed a summary
judgment, holding:
Stating the issue as to whether the summary judgment proof raises a fact
issue illustrates a basic fallacy found in the approach to summary judgments.
In such cases, the question on appeal, as well as in the trial court, is not
whether the summary judgment proof raises fact issues with reference to the
essential elements of a plaintiff's claim or cause of action, but is whether
the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that there is
no genuine issue of the fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the
plaintiff's cause of action."2
Thus, expert opinion testimony does not establish the fact (here the cause
of the malfunction) as a matter of law in cases of this type. On this
point, the court cited Broussard v. Moon." The court refused to follow
76 See note 67 Supra.
77411 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967).
78 Uninsured motorist clauses typically provide that the insurer will "pay all sums which the
insured . . .shall be legally entitled to recover . . . from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile." 450 S.W.2d at 65 n.1 (emphasis added).7
1O'Byrne v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 450 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1970). TEx. R. Crv. P. 166-A details the standards to be observed in grant or denial of a sum-
mary judgment.
80 Swafford v. Holman, 446 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
"'450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970).
"Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).
83431 S.W.2d $34 (Tex. 1968).
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Markwell v. General Tire & Rubber Co." because that case was based
upon the federal rule and was therefore Ctnot . . . persuasive.""
In Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hunt Petroleum Corp.," a trespass-to-try-title
suit, both parties moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff's motion
was overruled because his proof did not show notice of the adverse claim.
The trial court then granted the defendant's motion because plaintiff's
summary judgment proof had failed to establish this essential element.
The Texas supreme court reversed, holding that at the summary judgment
stage, a party's failure to discharge the burden which will rest on him
at a trial on the merits is not sufficient grounds to grant summary judg-
ment against him.
A similar situation involving motions for summary judgment filed by
both parties was presented to the Texas supreme court in DeBord v.
Muller." Jones executed a promissory note to Muller and delivered a
chattel mortgage on a boat as security. The mortgage was duly recorded.
Upon default, Muller sued for the amount of the note and foreclosure.
Judgment was rendered for the amount of the note but was silent on
the prayer for foreclosure. Jones sold the boat to DeBord, who in turn
sold it to Anderson. Muller then filed suit seeking damages for conver-
sion, or, alternatively, foreclosure of the mortgage. Muller filed a motion
for summary judgment supported by certified copies of the chattel mort-
gage and judgment against Jones. A hearing on the motion was held and
the court took the matter under advisement. DeBord then filed a motion
for summary judgment, setting up the defense of res judicata, which was
supported by certified copies of plaintiff's judgment and pleadings against
Jones. The court granted Muller's motion for summary judgment against
DeBord and denied DeBord's motion against Muller." The Texas supreme
court reversed, holding that both motions were entitled to be treated with
"equal dignity."" Since both motions were before the court at the time
judgment was rendered, all the evidence accompanying DeBord's motion
was likewise evidence in considering Muller's motion and vice versa. Thus,
an affidavit need not be specifically directed to a particular motion for
summary judgment to be considered by the court. The evidence attached
to DeBord's motion was before the court, and it rendered plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment unsupportable.
The requirements for a summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case were
discussed in Wampler v. Bill Sears Super Markets." The defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment was supported by the store manager's affida-
vit stating that he had been down the aisle where the accident occurred
five minutes before the fall and had seen no peach seed or peeling on
the floor. The plaintiff filed an affidavit describing the fall and the pres-
84 367 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966).
85450 S.W.2d at 829.
'6455 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1970).
87446 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1969).
s DeBord's motion was denied because he had failed to plead res judicata. Id. at 301.
89 d.
90452 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
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ence of the peach seed. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that
the movant had not shown as a matter of law that no material fact
issue existed. The court relied upon Scott v. T. G. & Y. Stores"1 and stated:
In that case the court states that in order to be entitled to summary judg-
ment pursuant to motion, the defendant has the negative burden of showing
that plaintiffs had no cause of action against it; as, for example, before it
could be entitled to summary judgment on its motion, the defendant had
the burden of showing that its employees did not put the liquid on the floor;
that its employees did not know that the substance was on the floor; and
that the substance had not been on the floor for such a length of time and
under such circumstances that a person of ordinary prudence in the exer-
cise of ordinary care would have discovered and removed it."2
Thus, the movant must negate all possible theories of liability.
The opposite side of the coin was presented in Snider v. Forrest Lumber
Co.,9 a trespass-to-try-title suit. The plaintiff moved for summary judg-
ment, attaching certified copies of an abstract of title. The abstract in-
cluded a deed of trust containing a provision that a sale by the trustee
raised a presumption that everything necessary to authorize the sale and
to render it valid existed and had been performed. The defendant filed
an affidavit stating that he and his wife had no actual notice of the sale.
The trial court entered a summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court
of civil appeals affirmed, holding that actual notice was not necessary
under the deed of trust and that the defendant's affidavit did not raise a
material issue. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff failed to
negate all possible defenses. The court rejected this argument, stating that
"in summary judgment proceedings in a trespass to try title suit, when
the moving party establishes by competent summary judgment evidence
the non-existence of an issuable fact, it then becomes incumbent upon
the adverse party to file counter-affidavits or other summary judgment
evidence creating an issue of material fact . . . ." While it may not be
appropriate to compare summary judgment proceedings in a trespass-to-
try-title case with those in a negligence case, these decisions reveal a
difference in the burden between a plaintiff and a defendant moving
for summary judgment. Absent summary judgment evidence by the op-
posing party, the defendant must negate all possible theories of liability
before he will be entitled to a summary judgment, while the plaintiff need
only establish one theory to entitle him to a summary judgment.
A similar case is Harrington v. YMCA, 5 a declaratory judgment action
involving the issue of whether a proposed building in a restricted sub-
division would violate zoning restrictions. The YMCA offered in support
of its motion for summary judgment an unsworn resolution by its board
9' 433 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), error ref. n.r.e.9'452 S.W.2d at 528.
93448 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tylcr 1969).
9"Id. at 135.
95452 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1970).
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of directors that it did not intend to violate the restrictions. The Texas
supreme court held that the judgment in favor of the YMCA must be
reversed, since that party had the burden to show that its building and
uses would not as a matter of law violate the restrictions. The unsworn
resolution of intention did not furnish that proof. The question remains
as to whether a sworn resolution would have been sufficient. Such a reso-
lution would only show the current intention of the parties not to vio-
late the restriction. This would appear to be a conclusion of law rather
than fact.
A number of cases raise the issue of what constitutes summary judg-
ment proof. In Norsworthy v. American Lease Plan," a suit upon a
written lease agreement, both parties filed unsworn pleadings. The plain-
tiff then filed an unsworn motion for summary judgment which was not
answered by defendant but which the trial court granted. The court of
civil appeals held that a summary judgment on the pleadings may never
be properly entered for the plaintiff when the defendant has a general
denial on file. However, as held in Rich v. Con-Stan Industries, Inc., 7
if the movant files an affidavit and the opponent files only unsworn plead-
ings, a genuine issue of fact is not raised, and the movant is entitled to
summary judgment. But, in a suit on a sworn account, a sworn denial
has the effect of neutralizing the affidavit of the plaintiff and thus prevents
summary judgment."' Maxey v. Rodman" held that detailed pleadings of
fraud and conspiracy do not preclude the granting of a summary judg-
ment when the other party presents sworn summary judgment proof.
Thus, opponents of summary judgment motions are compelled to provide
sworn proof that competently raises an issue of material fact.
In Le Tulle v. McDonald1 the court held that in a suit for an account-
ing under a trust, a will and codicil not included in the affidavit support-
ing the motion for summary judgment and not attached thereto nor
served therewith were not entitled to consideration in a summary judg-
ment hearing. Furthermore, it was held in Peterson v. Burks Around the
Clock Plumbing Co.1 that if the summary judgment opponent cannot
file an affidavit prior to the hearing, he must comply with rule 166-A 0 '
by filing an affidavit showing why he was unable to present by affidavit
the facts essential to justify the opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. In the absence of such an affidavit, the trial court may deny
a motion for continuance and grant the motion for summary judgment.
Peterson and Mitchell v. Lawson'" re-affirm the rule that the affidavit of
9 447 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969). See also National Soil Stabilizers, Inc.
v. American Lease Plan, 448 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), in which the court
held that where no affidavits or sworn pleadings were on file, no proof was presented and fact
issues arose from the pleadings.
17449 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
" Wilkinson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 444 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1969).
99444 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
50444 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
'1i449 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
502 TEx. R. Clv. P. 166-A.
'0444 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
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an interested party is sufficient to support a summary judgment where
his testimony is positive, clear, direct, and uncontradicted. However,
Rey v. American Capitol Insurance Co.'" indicates that in a suit on a prom-
issory note, where attorney's fees are at issue, the affidavit of the plaintiff's
attorney is questionable because he is an interested party.
In Lampar Co. v. Stanfield the affidavit of the appellee's attorney as
to the ownership of the debenture in question was held to be insufficient
for several reasons: "It is signed by one attorney for appellee and the
petition is signed by another; it does not even recite that the affiant
has read the petition or is familiar with its contents; and it does not
set forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, but contains only
conclusions of law.""05
The court of civil appeals in Langley v. Arnold D. Kamen & Co."
held that an affidavit not showing that the affiant was competent to testify
on its contents is not sufficient; neither is an affidavit which adopts the
pleading. The court found other defects in the affidavit, such as the ab-
sence of proof that the fees and commissions in question were agreed
upon or were usual, customary, or reasonable. Thus, the plaintiff did not
carry the burden necessary to entitle it to a summary judgment.
The contents of the record in summary judgment cases received the
attention of the court in Meek v. Cain,".. where it was held that extrinsic
documentary evidence not sworn to could not be considered by the court.
However, the court can consider depositions on file, as held in Blume v.
Curson,108 and such depositions are includable in the transcript on appeal
from a summary judgment.
Appellate Procedure. Appellate time limits were the subject of a number
of cases during the survey period." In Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp."'
the trial court signed an order dismissing the case for want of prosecution.
Four months later the trial court signed an order reinstating the cause
and then rendered final judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant then
filed suit seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the judgment,
alleging that it was invalid and void. The court of civil appeals held
that the judgment was void because the entry of the order of dismissal
was a judicial function and not a clerical one. Therefore, the order re-
instating the cause, which was entered more than thirty days from the
rendition of judgment, was ineffective.1"' Thus, the judgment was void
'04450 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
'0451 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
'o 455 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
107452 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970).
108447 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
'See Smith, Check List on Time Limits for Appeal in Texas, 26 TEX. B.J. 299 (1963), for
a table for determining these critical dates.
10447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
..' TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b, § 5 provides in part: "Judgments shall become final after the ex-
piration of thirty (30) days after the date of rendition of judgment or order overruling an original
or amended motion for new trial. After the expiration of thirty (30) days from the date the
judgment is rendered or motion for new trial overruled, the judgment cannot be set aside except
by bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law."
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because the trial court had lost jurisdiction."1 2
In Gallagher v. Schlundt"' appellant's motion for new trial was filed
on May 19, and on July 9, an order overruling the motion was signed.
The appellant attempted to effect an appeal from this order to the court
of civil appeals. However, the appellate court ruled that under rule
329b (4)11" the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law on
July 3. Thus, the order entered on July 9 was a nullity. The record was
filed with the court of civil appeals on September 8, some sixty-six days
after the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. Thus,
the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. On motion for
rehearing, the appellant filed a supplemental transcript which contained
an agreed motion of the parties postponing the hearing on the amended
motion for new trial from June 2 to June 27. But since the latter date
was within the forty-five-day period after the motion for new trial was
filed, it did not postpone the time for determination of the motion past
July 3.
In Mercer v. Band"' judgment was entered on June 20, and on June 27
defendants filed their original motion for new trial. On July 14, defen-
dants filed a motion captioned "Amended Motion for New Trial." The
prayer in that motion asked only that the judgment be set aside and that
defendants' motion for judgment be granted. It did not specifically ask
for a new trial. On August 8, the trial court held a hearing on the second
motion and ordered a new trial, but the formal order granting a new
trial was not signed and entered until August 14. Thus, the announce-
ment and docket sheet entry were made forty-two days after the filing
of the original motion for new trial, and the former order was signed
and entered forty-eight days after the motion for new trial. The court
of civil appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction because the second
motion was not a motion for new trial since it failed to comply with the
rules applicable to such motions by not specifically requesting a new trial.
Thus, it did not have any effect upon the original motion or the applicable
timetable. The trial court's order on August 8 had no effect, so de-
12 The court rejected the argument that the defendant had an adequate remedy at law by
means of appeal. 447 S.W.2d at 763-64.
113452 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970), error ref.
.
14TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b, § 4 provides:
It shall be the duty of the proponent of an original or amended motion for new
trial to present the same to the court within thirty (30) days after the same is filed.
However, at the discretion of the judge, an original motion or amended motion for
new trial may be presented or hearing thereon completed after such thirty (30) day
period. Such delayed hearing shall not operate to extend the time within which the
original or amended motion must be determined, unless such time be extended by
agreement as provided for in the preceding subdivision of this Rule. In the event an
original motion or amended motion for new trial be not presented within thirty
(30) days after the date of the filing thereof, and the judge in his discretion refuses
to consider the same or refuses to hear evidence relating thereto, such motion will
be overruled by operation of law forty-five (45) days after the same is filed, unless
disposed of by an order rendered on or before said date. In the event the decision
of the motion is postponed by any written agreement as provided in subdivision 3
of this Rule then any such original or amended motion, if not determined by the
court, will be overruled by operation of law ninety (90) days after the same is
filed or on the latest day certain agreed upon, whichever occurs first.
115 454 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970).
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fendant's motion for new trial was overruled at the expiration of forty-
five days. The court did hold that the trial court may grant a new trial
within thirty days from the date the motion for a new trial is overruled
by operation of law. Fulton v. Finch1 ' was distinguished on the grounds
that there the trial court sought to amend the original order granting
a motion for new trial. Thus, in the instant case, the trial court had
jurisdiction to grant a new trial, and such an order is not appealable.
Appellate time limits effectively terminated the appeal in Home Insur-
ance Co. v. Greene."' Twelve months after judgment was entered it was
amended by nunc pro tunc orders to include intervenors. The appellate
court held that the first judgment was the final judgment and the trial
court lost power to change the judgment when thirty days had expired.
Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell" was a suit on a note where the trial
judge orally announced a judgment in the principal amount of the note
but denied attorney's fees. Two days after the announcement in open
court, the judge signed the draft judgment awarding interest. Eight
months later, the judge, on his own motion, entered a nunc pro tunc
judgment deleting the award of interest. Subsequently, the judge granted
a new trial to the defendant. The appellate court held that the judgment
was rendered when announced in court, and that the provision in the
written draft of judgment awarding interest was a rendition. The error
was judicial and not clerical. Therefore, the nunc pro tunc judgment
was void, and the subsequent granting of a motion for a new trial was
likewise void. The appellate court indicated that the trial judge should
set aside the nunc pro tunc judgment and order a new trial.
In Bullock v. Land"9 a default judgment was rendered on October 30,
1968. The defendant filed his answer on November 4. A motion for new
trial was filed on November 18 and overruled on November 26. The
notice of appeal appeared in the order, dated December 20, overruling the
motion for a rehearing on the motion for a new trial. The cash deposit
in lieu of an appeal bond was filed January 6, 1969. The appellate court
dismissed the appeal, holding that since the motion for a new trial was
not filed within ten days after rendition of judgment, it could not be
considered in determining the time limit. Thus, the notice of appeal and
bond were not filed within the requisite time.
In Hancock v. Gathright"2' the suit was dismissed for want of prose-
cution on July 14, and a motion to reinstate was filed on August 7 and
answered on August 13. A sworn amended motion to reinstate was filed
on August 28. The court held that the motion failed to satisfy the re-
quirements of a bill of review and thus constituted a motion for new
trial. As such, it was filed too late to extend the court's jurisdiction, and
the order of reinstatement was void.
116 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823 (1961).
117443 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969), aff'd, 453 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1970).
"8450 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1970).
119443 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
"0451 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
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Green v. Davis... involved the time limit for filing the statement of
facts. The sixty days expired on September 29. The statement of facts
was received by the clerk of the court of civil appeals on September 25,
but was not signed by counsel. The clerk called the submitting counsel's
office but he was out of town. The clerk then mailed the statement of
facts to the attorney, who procured the necessary signatures and placed
the statement of facts in the mail on September 29. The clerk received
it on October 2. After being notified that the clerk would not file the
statement of facts, the counsel filed a motion for extension of time and
the court ordered the clerk to file the statement of facts. The appellee
was not notified of the motion for extension of time and filed a motion
to strike the statement of facts. The court of civil appeals struck the
statement of facts, since the timely filing of the record is jurisdictional
and cannot be waived, and since the fact that appellant's counsel was
ninety miles from court was insufficient justification to constitute good
cause for mailing the records rather than hand delivering them.
A similar situation was faced in Bracero Transportation Co. v. Crystal
City Independent School District.2' The appellant sought an extension
of time to file the statement of facts, which was due in the court of
civil appeals on January 19. On January 13, the appellant's attorney
mailed the statement of facts to the district clerk in the county where
the case was tried, with instructions to forward it to the court of civil
appeals. The district clerk received it on January 18, and the court of
civil appeals received it on January 20 in an envelope postmarked Janu-
ary 19. The court of civil appeals held that the appellant did not properly
comply with rule 5" since the statement of facts was mailed to the wrong
clerk and the envelope received by the court-of-civil-appeals clerk was
not postmarked one day before the due date. The facts did not present
good cause for failing to file timely and the appellant's motion for ex-
tension of time was denied.
Several cases have shown that judgments should be drafted with par-
ticular care. In Schell v. Centex Material Co., M the appellant sued the
two defendants for damages for breach of contract. Centex, one of the
defendants, filed a cross action and was granted a motion for summary
judgment as to the appellant's suit against it. The judgment stated that
t'this cause [shall] proceed to trial upon the remaining issues set out in
the Counterclaim of Defendant . . . and in the General Denial and
Answer to Counterclaim of Plaintiff . . . ."" Four months later, the trial
court rendered judgment on the cross action but the latter judgment
did not incorporate the first one. The court of civil appeals held that
121 451 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
122450 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970).
3 TEx. R. Clv. P. 5 provides, in part, that a court may enlarge a prescribed time period if
the required documents are 'sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in an en-
velope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and [are] deposited in the mail one day or
more before the last day for filing the same ....
124450 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
11 Id. at 674.
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the two judgments were interlocutory even though all of the matters
pending were disposed of. Thus, no appeal could be had from either
judgment.
In Gentry v. McKnight Construction Co. ' the plaintiff sought to
preserve a cause of action against one of two joint tort-feasors by spe-
cific language in the judgment. The actions were pending in separate
counties because one tort-feasor's plea of privilege was sustained and the
action transferred. The judgment recovered against the other recited:
"It is the further order of this court that this judgment is a judgment
against the defendant Jerry Lollar only, and by no means is to be con-
sidered as being a judgment against McKnight Construction Company
of Commerce, Texas . ... '"" McKnight Construction Company filed a
motion for summary judgment in the other suit, alleging the prior judg-
ment as a release and bar. The appellate court held that McKnight was
released because it is a fundamental rule that, regardless of the number
of causes of action which may be lawfully brought for a tortious injury,
only one satisfaction can be had. Apparently, the court felt that the
language in the judgment against Lollar was insufficient because it did
not constitute a reservation. The court did not explain what the legal
effect of such reservation would be. Thus, the court implied that even
the "fundamental rule" may be subject to limitation.
In County of Harris v. Black.1. the trial court, pursuant to the land-
owner's plea of abatement, "revested" a portion of the tract in question
in the landowner and abated and dismissed the condemnation suit inso-
far as that fractional portion was concerned. The county appealed the
order, but the court of civil appeals held that it was not appealable since
the entire matter was not disposed of as to either issues or parties.
Stanley v. Helton'" and Yates v. HogstromiW held that the filing of a
motion for new trial in a case where such a motion is not a prerequisite
for appeal ..1 does not limit the points of error which can be raised upon
appeal. In Weingarten, Inc. v. Moore... the Texas supreme court held that
mere reference to a prior motion in a motion for new trial was insufficient
to preserve the error, even though the prior motion made a particular
objection clear and certain.
The court of civil appeals in Cotton Concentration Co. v. H. Molsen
Co." held that a joint motion of three appellees for rehearing of their
separate actions against the same appellant, as if all three cases had been
consolidated, would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where the judg-
ment in each case was against a different party and for different amounts.




128448 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
129 451 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
130444 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
131 In both Stanley and Yates the motion for a new trial was not required because the original
trial had not been before a jury. TEx. R. Civ. P. 324.
132449 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1970).
1'3454 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970), error granted.
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In Donald v. First State Bank " the court refused to consider the ap-
pellant's grounds of error where the motion for new trial merely stated:
"The Court failed to submit defendant's defensive theories of the case.
'
Even though the appellant's brief was more specific, the court held that
substantial compliance with the rules was not achieved."
In keeping with the liberal interpretation of the rules as to appeal bonds,
the Texas supreme court in Owen v. Brawn... held that even though the
party appealing must be named as principal of the appeal bond and must
execute the bond as such, the courts are lenient in permitting amendments
of almost any sort of instrument that can be said to be a bond. In this
case, the appellant was granted leave to file an amended appeal bond.
In Wood v. Cosine,1"' a suit in the nature of a bill of review to set
aside a previous adoption, the appellee filed an answer and cross action
for adoption. The judgment recited that "the defendant's cross-action
and all relief prayed for therein is hereby denied for the reason that
Respondents presented no evidence in support of said cross-action.'...
Later, the appellee filed the instant suit, which was a new petition for
adoption, and the appellants urged res judicata. The court of civil appeals
held that in order to prevent the prior judgment from being res judicata,
the record must show that: (1) before its rendition the involved party
withdrew his pleadings and issues; or (2) the court refused to decide
the issues; or (3) a party failed to appear and prosecute his case. A dis-
missal resulted because none of these grounds was present.
Voir Dire and Argument. In Brockett v. Tice' ° the plaintiff's counsel
on voir dire inquired whether any of the jurors worked for an insurance
company and whether they thought a verdict would affect their insurance
rates. Also, while testifying, the plaintiff stated in an unresponsive answer
that the defendant had said he had insurance. The appellate court held
that, on the record as a whole, it appeared that the injection of insurance
was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition
of an improper judgment. The trial court's instructions to the jury were
ineffective to remove the harm.
In City of Houston v. Flanagan,4' while the jury was deliberating,
the plaintiff was lying on her side on a bench across from the entrance
to the courtroom. She had a wet cloth on her face and a grimace of pain.
The jury was released for lunch and its members observed the plaintiff
in this condition. The court held that since there was no showing that
this scene had been contrived for the purpose of influencing the jury, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
34 448 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
1"' Id.
11TEx. R. Cirv. P. 320-22 require that a motion for a new trial be set forth with specificity.
137 447 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. 1969).
138 447 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
119 Id. at 749.
140445 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
141 446 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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Three cases involved comment by counsel upon the failure to call a
witness. In Johnson v. Smith'" the court of civil appeals reiterated the
rule that counsel is permitted to comment on the failure of his adversary
to call a witness, and to conclude that such failure raises a presumption
that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable. However, the pre-
requisites for such comment are that the absent witness (1) must be
under the control of or related in some manner to the opponent, and
(2) must have had some material information on the point in issue. In
Gifford v. Woodruff" the appellate court held that it was prejudicial
error for the plaintiff to mention in argument the defendant's failure to
call an investigating officer and ambulance driver where it was not shown
that these parties were in any way associated with the defendant. An
identical result was reached in Magaline v. J. V. Harrison Truck Lines,
Inc., where the defendant's attorney repeatedly referred to witnesses
who lacked the required relationship to the plaintiff and stated what they
would have testified to.
A series of objectional arguments was considered in Texas Employers'
Insurance Association v. Hacker." In this workmen's compensation case,
the plaintiff argued hardship, even though hardship had been stipulated
out of the case. He argued that one of the doctors who testified was a
"tnotorious insurance company doctor;"'" that one of the adjusters had
been "dogging this Court-room all week;"" that he got "steamed up"1"'
when he saw an insurance company "kick a workman down" by slow pay-
ments; that the jury should apply the "Golden Rule." '49 The appellate
court held that the argument as to hardship was improper; that there
was no evidence that the doctor was a notorious insurance company
doctor and to so argue was error; that since the adjuster had been properly
called for jury service and excused from the panel, that argument was
improper; that the argument on the powerful insurance company was
surely prejudicial; but that the "Golden Rule" argument was approved
by the Texas supreme court,"10 and that evidence of slow payment was
in the record. On the record as a whole, the court found that the instruc-
tions of the trial court would have been ineffective to cure the error,
and that such statements were prejudicial and probably did cause the
rendition of an improper judgment.
Miscellaneous. An insurance company was subjected to onerous penalties
for failure to comply strictly with a judgment in Home Indemnity Co.
v. Muncy."1 The plaintiff recovered a judgment of $225,000 against the
142 446 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
143448 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
144446 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
'4 448 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.14'Id. at 239.
147 Id.
141 id. at 240.
149 Id.
19
°Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 169 S.W.2d 478 (1943).
15'449 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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defendant's insured. The defendant's policy limited liability coverage to
$5,000 plus supplementary payments of interest on the entire judgment
which accrued after entry of the judgment and before the company paid
or tendered a deposit in the court for that part of the judgment covered
by liability limits. The judgment was rendered on April 10, and on April
14, the defendant deposited $5,000 into the registry of the court. On
April 15, the judgment was amended to include joint and several liability
which had been omitted by oversight. In a suit to recover interest on
the judgment, the plaintiff argued that the insurance company was liable
for interest on the entire amount of the judgment. The appellate court
affirmed this view. The court held that the amended judgment constituted
a clerical change. Since there was nothing in the record to assist in the
determination of whether this was a clerical or judicial error, the court
adopted the rule of a presumption in favor of the original judgment.
Thus, the defendant was liable for four days' interest on the judgment
at the time it deposited $5,000 into the court. The insurance company,
therefore, had not discharged its liability under the supplemental-payments
clause of the policy. Thus, interest on the entire $225,000 continued to
accrue from the date of the judgment, April 1964, to the date of the
appellate court's decision in 1969, and the insurance company was liable
for the full amount of interest. The decision is based on good legal grounds
by a careful analysis of both the policy and the law applicable to judg-
ments, and it serves to illustrate that significant liability may be incurred
for failure to comply completely with the policy and the judgment.
Conclusion. Among procedural developments during the survey period
was the promulgation of certain changes to the rules which became effec-
tive January 1, 1971."' Most of the changes were housecleaning procedures,
but several deserve mention. Rule 2011"' was amended and rules 2021"
and 2031" were repealed to eliminate the necessity of applying for the
issuance of a commission to take oral depositions. All that is now required
is the giving of notice of the time and place of the depositions. Other
changes include: rule 39,"" joinder of parties, was rewritten to coincide
with federal rule 19; 157 rule 97 '5' now expressly provides that settlement
with one party does not operate as a bar to a constitution of the action
against any remaining parties; rule 167.. now allows the discovery of the
identity and location of any potential party or witness; rule 189's° was
rewritten to dispense with the requirement of filing notice of intent to
depose on written interrogatories and to require ten days' notice; rule 2 2 0 '6'
152 The amendments were adopted by an order of the Supreme Court of Texas dated July 21,
1970.
153TEX. R. Cir. P. 201.
154 1d. 202.
135 id. 203.
15 6 id. 39.
157 FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
"5 TEx. R. Cirv. P. 97.
'
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now provides that the failure of a party to appear for trial is deemed a
waiver of a jury trial; and rules 19 3 ' and 194 ' " have been repealed. A
number of cases which are of some interest are included in a footnote.1"
025Id. 193.
' Id. 194.
'Abatement: Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Neeley, 443 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1969), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 452 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1970) (a plea in abatement
timely filed, but not presented to the court before trial, is waived).
Appeal:
Motion for New Trial: Reynolds v. Reynolds, 452 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970)
(rule that only one amended motion for new trial may be filed is mandatory).
Notice: Crow v. Batchelor, 453 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1970) (notice is not required on appeal
from interlocutory order).
Time Limits: Holliday v. Holliday, 453 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970)
(in the absence of a timely filed motion for an extension of time to file statement of facts appel-
late courts have no authority to permit a late filing); Torres v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 449 S.W.2d
148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969), error granted (where summary judgment is granted, appellate
time limits are extended by filing motion for new trial).
Attorney's Fees: Eisenbeck v. Buttgen, 450 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970) (a con-
tract concerning payment of gross earnings of a business is not a special contract under TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (1964) and attorney's fees were not recoverable in a suit on the
contract).
Declaratory Judgment: State v. Fuller, 451 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970), error
granted (the effect of a declaratory judgment is not to merge a cause of action in the judgment
or to bar it, but is res judicata only as to the matters declared by the judgment).
Dismissal: New Friendship Baptist Church v. Collins, 453 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1970) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not a bar to a subsequent suit on the same cause of
action).
Injunctions: West v. Pennyrich Int'l, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969) (an
order granting a temporary injunction must detail the reasons for granting and the specific acts
enjoined).
Judgments:
Default Judgment: Jack Ritter Inc. Oil Co. v. Sell, 443 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1969) (where plaintiff fails to appear after consolidation of his suit with separate action of de-
fendant, trial court is not authorized to enter take-nothing judgment against plaintiff and grant de-
fendant's affirmative relief, but can only dismiss plaintiff's suit for want of prosecution).
Summary judgment: Tubb v. Carter-Gragg Oil Co., 455 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1970), error ref. n.r.e., and Layne v. Darnell, 454 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1970), error ref. n.r.e. (where determination of motion for summary judgment involved credi-
bility, weight, or inference of evidence, summary judgment is not proper); Ellis v. Sinton Sav.
Ass'n, 455 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970), error ref. n.r.e. (where movant's
summary judgment affidavits reveal evidence sufficient to sustain instructed verdict at trial, op-
ponent has the burden to show opposing evidence raising a material fact issue).
Validity: Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Anderson, 445 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1969) (judgment de-
claring liability insurer would be liable to pay if liability found against insured is invalid as an
advisory opinion).
Mistrial: Brown v. Friedman, 451 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970) (failure to object
to improper argument when made constitutes a waiver of right to mistrial); M.L. Mayfield Petro-
leum Corp. v. Kelly, 450 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error ref. n.r.e. (where
jury struck some issues and trial court rendered verdict on answered issues, failure to object before
the jury was discharged constituted a waiver of right to urge motion for mistrial).
Parties: Campbell v. Jefferson, 453 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error dismissed;
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 446 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969) (a subrogated car-
rier with notice of a subsequent suit by the insured waives its subrogation claim by not inter-
vening).
Special Issues: Griffey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 452 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
error ref. n.r.e. (request for 18 special issues in one instrument constitutes a waiver of complaint
for refusal to submit).
Stipulations: Wilkins v. Cook, 454 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
(a stipulation must be formally retracted before contradictory evidence can be introduced).
